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CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION OVER
GROUNDWATER DISCHARGES AFTER COUNTY
OF MAUI V. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND
Jocelyn Lee*
The Clean Water Act is the principal federal law aimed at controlling
pollution of the nation’s water resources, yet it does not provide
comprehensive oversight of pollutants entering groundwater, the subsurface
water that often feeds into rivers, lakes, and oceans. This Note examines a
recent Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund,
which appeared to endorse a theory of federal regulation of groundwater
discharges under the Clean Water Act. County of Maui established a
“functional equivalent” standard, under which a discharge through
groundwater is subject to the Clean Water Act’s permitting requirements if
it is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge into jurisdictional surface
waters. While the Court outlined several factors for courts to consider in
making a functional equivalent determination, the decision offers limited
guidance for lower courts applying the test. Moreover, it leaves an important
regulatory question unanswered. This Note aims to address some of the
persisting uncertainties by proposing that Justice Kennedy’s “significant
nexus” standard from his Rapanos v. United States concurrence can be
illuminating. This Note argues that overlaying the significant nexus standard
on the functional equivalent test offers a practical strategy for lower courts
applying the test in difficult cases.
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INTRODUCTION
It is well established that surface waters—including rivers, lakes, and
oceans—are often hydrologically connected to groundwater.1 Groundwater
is the subsurface water that saturates pores or cracks in permeable geologic
formations called aquifers2 and is replenished by precipitation.3 It has been
shown to contribute 52 percent of annual streamflow across the country,4 and
it serves as a major source of fresh water for agriculture and public supplies.5
Consequently, groundwater contamination can have significant
consequences for surface water quality and water supply.6
1. See THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., CIRCULAR 1139, GROUND
WATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE 1 (1999), https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ
/1998/1139/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJZ7-8APM]; see also Brewster Conant Jr. et al., A
Framework for Conceptualizing Groundwater-Surface Water Interactions and Identifying
Potential Impacts on Water Quality, Water Quantity, and Ecosystems, 574 J. HYDROLOGY
609, 609 (2019).
2. See Groundwater Basics, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://www.usgs.gov/missionareas/water-resources/science/groundwater-basics?qt-science_center_objects=0#qtscience_center_objects [https://perma.cc/SG78-U5LP] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
3. See id.
4. See WINTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 12.
5. See Groundwater Use in the United States, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV.,
https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/groundwater-use-unitedstates?qt-science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects
[https://perma.cc/B36WESG4] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
6. See WINTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
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However, no federal statute—including the Clean Water Act7 (CWA), the
principal federal law governing water pollution8—comprehensively
regulates discharges to tributary groundwater.9 The CWA’s success at
reducing releases of pollutants into surface waters over the last few decades10
can be attributed in large part to § 301(a) of the Act.11 This provision
essentially provides that all discharges from point sources—for example,
pipes or wells—into “waters of the United States” are unlawful unless
specifically authorized by permit.12 Permits contain technology-based
limitations on the quantity and type of pollutants that can be released and—
paired with the statute’s citizen suit provision13 and civil, criminal, and
administrative enforcement provisions—create an effective enforcement
mechanism.14 The CWA’s implementing agencies, the EPA and U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”), have explicitly defined “waters of the
United States” to exclude all groundwater.15 Nevertheless, a few theories for
CWA regulation of discharges into tributary groundwater have found support
in the courts, legal scholarship, and agency practice, including the “navigable
waters theory” and the “conduit theory.”16
On April 23, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision that
appeared to agree with the conduit theory. The 6-3 decision in County of
Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund17 addressed the following question: does
§ 301(a) of the CWA cover discharges that travel from a point source through
groundwater before being conveyed to surface waters? The Court’s answer:
sometimes. The majority set forth a new “functional equivalent” test, which
requires a discharger to obtain a CWA permit “if the addition of the pollutants
through groundwater is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from

7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388.
8. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30030, CLEAN WATER ACT: A
SUMMARY OF THE LAW 1 (2016).
9. See Michael C. Blumm & Steven M. Thiel, (Ground)waters of the United States:
Unlawfully Excluding Tributary Groundwater from Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 46 ENV’T
L. 333, 334 (2016); Mary Christina Wood, Regulating Discharges into Groundwater: The
Crucial Link in Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 569,
570 (1988).
10. William L. Andreen, Success and Backlash: The Remarkable (Continuing) Story of
the Clean Water Act, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 25, 28 (2013).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
12. See id. (prohibiting “the discharge of any pollutant by any person” unless authorized
by permit). The statute defines “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source.” Id. § 1362(12). “Navigable waters” is defined as
“the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” Id. § 1362(7).
13. The CWA contains a citizen suit provision, allowing concerned citizens to sue and
enforce the Act’s protections against violators of the statute. Id. § 1365. Citizen groups may
not bring suit under this provision if a discharge falls outside the scope of CWA jurisdiction.
14. See COPELAND, supra note 8, at 3–7.
15. See Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,”
85 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,251 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R.
pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 232, 300, 302, and 401); see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(5)
(2020); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(2)(v) (2020).
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).
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the point source into navigable waters.”18 The Court also supplied a list of
seven “potentially relevant factors” for lower courts to consider when making
such a determination.19
The County of Maui decision represented a significant win for
environmental interests, since a categorical “no” from the Court would have
opened the door for polluting entities to avoid CWA enforcement by
discharging into groundwater rather than surface waters.20 However, it was
also met with criticism that the functional equivalent test provided inadequate
guidance for lower courts, permitting agencies, and the regulated
community.21 Further, the way that some practitioners have characterized
the decision suggests a degree of ambiguity regarding whether the Court left
the door open to a theory that “waters of the United States” includes
groundwater.22
Given the fact-specific nature of the functional equivalent standard and the
underlying uncertainty about what the decision means for the “waters of the
United States” debate, lower courts will play an important role in shaping the
test. The range of scenarios that are found to satisfy the test will have
practical consequences for regulated entities seeking to understand when
they should apply for a permit and what liability they might be subject to, as
well as for citizen groups interested in bringing enforcement actions.23 At
the same time, lower courts may need to adjust and respond as agency
guidance on the relationship between groundwater and “waters of the United
States” develops.
Part I of this Note locates the County of Maui decision in a decades-long
political story, marked more by uncertainty than certainty, concerning the
scope of the CWA. This story is essential to understanding the significance
of the Court’s functional equivalent test and the questions the test raises about
the Act’s relationship to groundwater and Congress’s legislative goals. Part
I also explains the regulatory context in which County of Maui was decided
and examines the Court’s new standard for determining whether a permit is
required where discharged pollutants travel through groundwater before
reaching surface waters. Part II illuminates the obvious and latent problems
posed by the functional equivalent test and what these mean for stakeholders
on the ground. Finally, Part III suggests a “significant nexus” overlay
framework for lower courts to understand and apply the County of Maui
standard in difficult cases. Part III argues that such an approach is both
practical and protective of the nation’s water resources.
18. Id. at 1468.
19. See id. at 1476–77.
20. See Adam Liptak, Clean Water Act Covers Groundwater Discharges, Supreme Court
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/us/supreme-courtclean-water-act-hawaii.html [https://perma.cc/K2BU-QHDV].
21. See, e.g., County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1483 (Alito, J., dissenting); Ellen M. Gilmer
& Amena H. Saiyid, SCOTUS Clean Water Act Test ‘Devastating’ for Industry, BLOOMBERG
L. (Apr. 23, 2020, 5:13PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document
/X3FE893G000000 [https://perma.cc/Y8QV-WFHM].
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part II.A.
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I. THE ROAD TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF GROUNDWATER DISCHARGES
UNDER THE CWA
Congress’s first comprehensive attempt to control water pollution was the
passage of the 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act.24 After multiple
amendments to the law during the 1950s and 1960s, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 197225 finally established the basic
structure of the CWA as it is known today.26 Part I.A provides an overview
of the CWA and its two permitting programs. Part I.B introduces two
theories of CWA jurisdiction over groundwater discharges and dives into the
related case law and regulatory history. Finally, Part I.C explains the County
of Maui decision.
A. The CWA
The CWA’s objective is to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”27 To this end, § 301(a) of
the Act sets forth a broad prohibition against “the discharge of any pollutant
by any person” unless the discharge is specifically authorized by permit.28
This statutory scheme aims to manage pollution to surface waters by
requiring individual dischargers to obtain permits containing enforceable
technology-based limitations.29 The CWA also states Congress’s intent to
“recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution” and to “plan the
development and use . . . of land and water resources.”30
The Act establishes two permitting programs that form the regulatory
framework for federal water pollution control. Section 402 of the CWA
authorizes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
24. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1388); see also William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional
Prescription for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 202, 210 (1987).
25. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
26. See Andreen, supra note 24, at 212–16.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The U.S. House of Representatives’ report on the CWA stated
that “[t]he word ‘integrity’ . . . refers to a condition in which the natural structure and function
of ecosystems [are] maintained.” H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 76 (1972).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); see also COPELAND, supra note 8, at 5.
29. See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United
States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972 (pt.2), 22 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 215, 286
(2003); Vanessa Ramirez, An Attempt at Clearing the Muddied Waters of the United States,
34 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 161, 164 (2019).
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). This cooperative federalism framework has been described as
one where “federal and state governments work together in structured, overlapping, and
synergistic ways to achieve . . . improved water quality nationwide.” Robin Kundis Craig,
Adapting Water Federalism to Climate Change Impacts: Energy Policy, Food Security, and
the Allocation of Water Resources, 5 ENV’T & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 183, 202 (2010).
However, it has also been characterized as a federal-state partnership that is “heavily federal.”
Oliver A. Houck, Cooperative Federalism, Nutrients, and the Clean Water Act: Three Cases
Revisited, 44 ENV’T L. REP. 10,426, 10,426 (2014).
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permit program,31 which serves as the Act’s main enforcement mechanism32
and applies to discharges of most “pollutants” into jurisdictional waters.33
NPDES permits are administered by the EPA34 and contain limitations on
the quantity of pollutants that can be discharged, as well as water monitoring
and reporting requirements.35 Under § 404 of the CWA, the Corps
administers a second permit program36 specifically for discharges of dredged
or fill material37 to jurisdictional waters, including wetlands.38 Activities
subject to § 404 permitting typically include filling wetlands for
development, infrastructure and water resource projects, and mining
projects.39
The scope of federal regulatory authority under the NPDES and § 404
programs lies in the meaning of “discharge of a pollutant,” which the CWA
defines as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.”40 This language suggests that not all pollutant discharges are
subject to the Act’s permitting requirements.41 First, the discharge must
enter “navigable waters,” which are defined as “the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas,” a phrase that is not further explained in
the statute.42 Second, covered discharges must come from a “point source,”
defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from
31. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
32. See COPELAND, supra note 8, at 6.
33. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a). The CWA defines “pollutant” broadly to include dredged
spoil, solid waste, chemical wastes, biological materials, heat, rock, sand, and other materials
discharged into water. Id. § 1362(6).
34. See id. § 1342(a). While this Note describes NPDES permitting as carried out by the
EPA, the CWA allows the EPA to authorize states to administer the program. Id. § 1342(b).
All but a few states have received authorization. See NPDES State Program Authority, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-authority [https://perma.cc/R9NW-PNCB]
(last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a); see also NPDES Permit Basics, EPA, https://www.epa.gov
/npdes/npdes-permit-basics [https://perma.cc/3RH5-KGDN] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
36. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d). The CWA also allows for states to administer the § 404
program upon EPA authorization. Id. § 1344(g)–1344(h). However, only three states are
authorized. U.S. Interactive Map of State and Tribal Assumption Under CWA Section 404,
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cwa404g/us-interactive-map-state-and-tribal-assumption-undercwa-section-404 [https://perma.cc/H3NF-BEFR] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
37. Dredged material includes material that is excavated or dredged from jurisdictional
waters. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2020). Fill material includes material placed in jurisdictional
waters that has the effect of replacing some portion of the water with dry land or changing the
bottom elevation of the jurisdictional water. Id.
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); Permit Program Under CWA Section 404, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/permit-program-under-cwa-section-404
[https://perma.cc/
CTS7-GBKN] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). Wetlands are generally characterized as areas
where water covers the land or is present at or near the surface of the soil for at least some
periods of time during the year, such that conditions support the growth of aquatic plants.
What Is a Wetland?, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/wetlands/what-wetland [https://perma.cc
/H3ND-6JPC] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
39. Permit Program Under CWA Section 404, supra note 38.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). For the statutory definition of “pollutant,” see supra note 33.
41. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY 697 (8th ed. 2018).
42. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
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which pollutants are or may be discharged,” such as a “pipe, ditch,
channel . . . [or] well.”43
B. Theories of CWA Jurisdiction over Groundwater Discharges
Among the theories of CWA jurisdiction over discharges to groundwater
that have arisen under these statutory requirements,44 two are most relevant
to the discussion of County of Maui.45 The first, the navigable waters theory,
posits that groundwater can be considered “navigable waters” under the Act
in certain circumstances.46 This theory runs counter to the EPA and the
Corps’s definition of “waters of the United States,” which categorically
excludes groundwater.47 The second, the conduit theory, suggests that
groundwater can operate as a conduit that carries pollution from a point
source to jurisdictional surface waters.48
1. The Navigable Waters Theory
There has long been a general understanding that “waters of the United
States”—the phrase the CWA uses to define “navigable waters”—
encompasses more than just navigable-in-fact waters.49 Courts and the
federal agencies have at various points considered wetlands, nonnavigable
tributaries, and other nonnavigable waters to be “waters of the United
States.”50 The navigable waters theory uses this broad definition as a basis

43. Id. § 1362(14).
44. See Damien Schiff, Keeping the Clean Water Act Cooperatively Federal—or, Why the
Clean Water Act Does Not Directly Regulate Groundwater Pollution, 42 WM. & MARY ENV’T
L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 460 (2018); Kathrine Klaus, Note, The Conduit Theory: Protecting
Navigable Waters from Discharges to Tributary Groundwater, 43 VT. L. REV. 871, 878
(2019).
45. A third theory, the point source theory, proposes that groundwater is a “point source”
of pollution. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky held in favor of the
point source theory. See Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 303 F. Supp. 3d 530, 542 (E.D.
Ky. 2017). However, the Sixth Circuit rejected the point source theory when it partially
affirmed the district court’s ruling. See Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 905 F.3d 925,
933, 938 (6th Cir. 2018), abrogated by County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct.
1462 (2020).
46. See generally Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9; Wood, supra note 9.
47. See Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be
codified at 33 C.F.R pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 232, 300, 302,
and 401); see also supra text accompanying note 15.
48. See, e.g., Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, 887 F.3d 637, 651–52
(4th Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 2736 (2020), abrogated by County of Maui, 140 S. Ct.
1462; Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated, 140
S. Ct. 1462; see also Schiff, supra note 44; Klaus, supra note 44.
49. See William W. Sapp et al., From the Fields of Runnymede to the Waters of the United
States: A Historical Review of the Clean Water Act and the Term “Navigable Waters,” 36
ENV’T L. REP. 10,190, 10,191 (2006).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1330 (6th Cir.
1974) (holding that CWA jurisdiction extended to nonnavigable tributaries); United States v.
Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (holding that CWA jurisdiction extended to
nonnavigable mangrove wetlands); Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,058 (June 29,
2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 44 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 300, 302,
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for proposing that groundwater can also be classified as a jurisdictional
water.51
However, the extent to which nonnavigable waters, including
groundwater, constitute “waters of the United States” is murky and has been
the subject of intense debate in the courts, federal agencies, and legal
scholarship since the 1980s.52 Where the line is drawn has significant
consequences, because the vast majority of the nation’s waters are neither
navigable-in-fact waters nor wetlands adjoining navigable-in-fact waters.53
Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the relationship
between groundwater and “waters of the United States,” it has attempted to
clarify the bounds of “waters of the United States” on three separate
occasions.54 These cases were confined to questions about what types of
wetlands should be regulated as “waters of the United States,” but the Court’s
analyses are relevant to groundwater because the same statutory language
and congressional intent are discussed.55 In United States v. Riverside
Bayview,56 a unanimous Court found that Congress intended to define
jurisdictional waters broadly and agreed with the Corps’s interpretation that
wetlands abutting navigable waters fell within the meaning of “waters of the
United States.”57 Notably, the Court based its decision in part on ecological
considerations, stating that pollution to adjacent wetlands would impact the
water quality of the larger “aquatic system.”58 Then, in Solid Waste Agency
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,59 the Court rejected the Corps’s position
that isolated ponds used as habitats by migratory birds were covered by the
CWA.60 The Court clarified that its Riverside Bayview holding was based
on the “significant nexus” between the adjacent wetlands and navigable
waters.61 Because the ponds in Solid Waste Agency did not abut navigable
waters, a “significant nexus” was lacking, and the CWA could not be read to
apply to the ponds.62
Finally, in Rapanos v. United States63 the Supreme Court split 4-1-4 on
the question of whether “waters of the United States” includes a wetland that
at least occasionally empties into a tributary of a navigable-in-fact water.64
and 401) (defining “waters of the United States” to include tributaries, wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters, and other nonnavigable waters).
51. See Wood, supra note 9, at 586.
52. See Sapp et al., supra note 49, at 10,212–13. See generally Ramirez, supra note 29.
53. See Sapp et al., supra note 49, at 10,190.
54. See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
55. Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9, at 351.
56. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
57. Id. at 133–34.
58. Id. at 134.
59. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
60. See id. at 167.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
64. See id. at 729.
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Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia defined “waters
of the United States” as including only “relatively permanent, standing or
continuously flowing bodies of water.”65 He reasoned that the word
“navigable” should not be entirely read out of the statute; its inclusion at least
requires that “waters of the United States” contain “the ordinary presence of
water.”66 Justice Scalia then concluded that the determinative factor should
be whether a wetland has a “continuous surface connection” to adjacent
navigable waters such that “there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’
and wetlands.”67 He limited the significance of the Riverside Bayview
majority’s reliance on ecological factors, stating that such considerations
may only be invoked when the case presents a boundary-drawing problem.68
Of primary concern for Justice Scalia was that allowing the Corps to require
permits for filling wetlands with only an intermittent connection to
traditionally navigable waters would impinge on the states’ traditional
powers over land and water use.69 He wrote, “We ordinarily expect a ‘clear
and manifest’ statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented
intrusion into traditional state authority. The phrase ‘the waters of the United
States’ hardly qualifies.”70
Meanwhile, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence articulated a much
broader “significant nexus” test, under which CWA jurisdiction attaches on
a case-by-case basis if wetlands “either alone or in combination with
similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity” of traditionally navigable waters.71 If the
effects of wetlands on downstream water quality are instead “speculative or
insubstantial,” they cannot be considered “waters of the United States.”72
Something more than the mere existence of a hydrologic connection is
required,73 and Justice Kennedy indicated that quantity and regularity of
water flow in the tributaries connecting a wetland to navigable waters may
be an important part of the significant nexus analysis.74 Further, Justice
Kennedy stated that the significant nexus determination should be made with
regard to Congress’s goal of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical,

65. Id. at 739.
66. See id. at 734 (“As we noted in [Solid Waste Agency], the traditional term ‘navigable
waters’ . . . carries some of its original substance: ‘[I]t is one thing to give a word limited
effect and quite another to give it no effect whatever.’ That limited effect includes, at bare
minimum, the ordinary presence of water.” (quoting Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001))).
67. Id. at 742.
68. See id. (“Wetlands with only an intermittent, physically remote hydrologic connection
to ‘waters of the United States’ do not implicate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside
Bayview . . . .”).
69. See id. at 738.
70. Id. (citation omitted) (first quoting BFP v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994);
and then quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)).
71. Id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 784.
74. See id. at 786.

2782

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”75 While he
recognized that his standard does not fit neatly within the traditional zone of
federal authority, he observed it “does not raise federalism . . . concerns
sufficient to support a presumption against its adoption.”76 Justice Kennedy
criticized the plurality’s standard as inconsistent with the text, structure, and
purpose of the CWA.77 He argued that requiring permanent or continuously
flowing water is impractical, given the Act’s concern with downstream water
quality78 and that requiring a surface water connection finds no support in
the structure of the Act.79
In the wake of Rapanos, there was significant uncertainty in the courts and
debate in legal scholarship about which opinion controlled.80 Many courts
have said that Justice Kennedy’s test controls,81 citing the Supreme Court’s
guidance in Marks v. United States.82 However, other courts have held that
either Justice Kennedy’s or Justice Scalia’s test can be used to find CWA
jurisdiction over waters.83 The EPA and the Corps took the former approach,
publishing the highly controversial Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters
of the United States” (“the Clean Water Rule”) in 2015.84 The Clean Water
Rule adopted Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test85 by establishing three
75. Id. at 779 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
76. Id. at 782.
77. Id. at 776.
78. Id. at 769 (“The merest trickle, if continuous, would count as a ‘water’ subject to
federal regulation, while torrents thundering at irregular intervals through otherwise dry
channels would not. Though the plurality seems to presume that such irregular flows are too
insignificant to be of concern in a statute focused on ‘waters,’ that may not always be true.”).
79. Id. at 774.
80. See generally PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 41, at 692; James Murphy, Muddying the
Waters of the Clean Water Act: Rapanos v. United States and the Future of America’s Water
Resources, 31 VT. L. REV. 355, 357 (2007).
81. See United States v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2007); N. Cal.
River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke
Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2006).
82. 430 U.S. 188 (1977); id. at 193 (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.))).
83. See United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 209–10 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 60 (1st
Cir. 2006).
84. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
328 and 44 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 300, 302, and 401). The agencies
received over one million public comments on the proposed version. Id. at 37,057. The final
rule was challenged by a majority of states. Timothy Cama, 27 States Challenge Obama Water
Rule in Court, HILL (June 30, 2015, 12:02 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energyenvironment/246539-27-states-challenge-obama-water-rule-in-court [https://perma.cc/CGT4
-C623]. Congress also attempted to overturn the final rule, but President Barack Obama
vetoed the resolution. Timothy Cama, Obama Vetoes GOP Attempt to Block Water Rule, HILL
(Jan. 19, 2016, 7:22 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/266395-obamavetoes-gop-attempt-to-block-water-rule [https://perma.cc/GP9B-S8QH].
85. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,056 (“An important element of the agencies’
interpretation of the CWA is the significant nexus standard [developed in Riverside Bayview
and Solid Waste Agency] and refined in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Rapanos.”).
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categories of waters: jurisdictional by rule, nonjurisdictional, and casespecific waters that turn on a finding of a significant nexus.86 Yet, the Clean
Water Rule placed groundwater in the nonjurisdictional category—meaning
that, regardless of any connection to surface waters, groundwater never
constitutes “waters of the United States.”87
The Clean Water Rule was short-lived, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit issued a nationwide stay on the rule just two months after it
became effective,88 and in early 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued an
executive order sending the rule back to the agencies for further review.89 In
the order, President Trump directed the agencies to “consider interpreting the
term ‘navigable waters,’ . . . in a manner consistent with” Justice Scalia’s
plurality opinion in Rapanos.90 On April 21, 2020, just two days before the
Supreme Court handed down its County of Maui decision, the EPA and the
Corps released the rule’s replacement, the Navigable Waters Protection Rule:
Definition of “Waters of the United States”91 (“the WOTUS Rule”). Like
the one it replaced, this rule provided that groundwater was categorically
excluded from the definition of “waters of the United States.”92
In contrast to the agencies’ stance, advocates of the navigable waters
theory have argued that Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test requires
direct federal regulation of at least some groundwater as “waters of the
United States.”93 These advocates emphasize the science, which supports
the critical importance of groundwater for the health of other water bodies,
humans, and the economy.94 They argue that the CWA’s goal of “restor[ing]
and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
86. Id. at 37,057. “Paragraph (c)(5) of the rule defines the term ‘significant nexus’ to
mean a significant effect (more than speculative or insubstantial) on the chemical, physical,
or biological integrity of a traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas.”
Id. at 37,091.
87. Id. at 37,059.
88. Ohio v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (In re Env’t Prot. Agency & Dep’t of Def. Final
Rule), 803 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2015).
89. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 3 C.F.R. 296 (2018).
90. Id. at 297.
91. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified
at 33 C.F.R pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 232, 300, 302, and 401).
This rule was part of a broader effort by the Trump administration to scale back regulation
under the CWA and other federal environmental laws. Nadja Popovich et al., The Trump
Administration Is Reversing More than 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trumpenvironment-rollbacks-list.html [https://perma.cc/Y45C-ERF2].
92. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,250.
93. See Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9, at 337.
94. See id.; Wood, supra note 9, at 569–70. In 2014, the EPA’s Science Advisory Board
issued a letter approving of most of the proposed Clean Water Rule, including the rule’s
application of the significant nexus test to certain waters but rejecting the decision to
categorically exclude groundwater. The letter explained that groundwater “can be critical in
supporting the hydrology and biogeochemical functions of wetlands and other waters,” and
therefore the rule’s exclusion did not have scientific justification. See Letter from Dr. David
T. Allen, Chair, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency Sci. Advisory Bd., to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, U.S.
Env’t Prot. Agency (Sept. 30, 2014), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey
=P100RO1P.TXT [https://perma.cc/GCE4-UHQB].
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Nation’s waters”95 cannot be accomplished without federal regulation of
groundwater that shares a significant nexus with surface waters.96 Further,
these advocates assert that a significant body of case law, including the
Supreme Court’s decision in Riverside Bayview, supports an expansive
interpretation of CWA jurisdiction that includes some groundwater.97
One critic of the navigable waters theory points to the fact that the CWA
only provides for direct federal regulation of “navigable waters,” despite
distinguishing between “navigable waters” and “ground waters” in multiple
places.98 Critics also argue that the CWA’s legislative history precludes any
reading of “navigable waters” that includes groundwater because committees
in both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives acknowledged the
importance of groundwater yet chose not to establish federal groundwater
standards.99 Moreover, Representative Les Aspin proposed an amendment
on the House floor that would have explicitly prohibited any unpermitted
discharges to groundwater, but it was voted down.100
Additionally, opponents of federal regulation of groundwater argue that
expanding the CWA in this way would have dire policy implications.101
Certain federal statutes, including the Safe Drinking Water Act102 (SDWA),
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976103 (RCRA), and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980104 regulate specific activities affecting groundwater. Many states
have passed laws that regulate discharges to groundwater to varying
extents.105 Those who urge leaving groundwater regulation to these federal
statutes and the states warn that applying CWA permitting requirements to
groundwater would lead to duplicative permitting and overburdened
agencies.106 Applying the CWA to groundwater would also “disincentivize
the implementation of voluntary conservation practices” in agriculture,
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
96. See Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9, at 378 (“To fulfill the purpose of the CWA, the
agencies must protect the quality of the nation’s waters by including groundwater among those
waters whose jurisdiction is dependent upon a case-specific analysis of their nexus to other
jurisdictional waters.”).
97. Id. at 366–67.
98. See Schiff, supra note 44, at 449–50.
99. See id. at 462; see also Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24
F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court’s holding that groundwater is never
among the “waters of the United States” in part because congressional proposals to add
groundwater to the scope of the CWA were defeated).
100. See Schiff, supra note 44, at 462.
101. See Scott Yager & Mary-Thomas Hart, The Tipping Point Source: Clean Water Act
Regulation of Discharges to Surface Water via Groundwater, and Specific Implications for
Nonpoint Source Agriculture, 23 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 439, 467–68 (2018).
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-27.
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6987.
104. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26,
33, and 42 U.S.C.).
105. See THOMSON REUTERS, 50 STATE REGULATORY SURVEYS: ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS:
POLLUTION: PERMITS FOR GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER DISCHARGE, 0070
REGSURVEYS 13 (Apr. 2020).
106. See Yager & Hart, supra note 101, at 467–68.
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“[b]lur[] the line between point and nonpoint source regulation,” and
“cripple” regulated entities.107
However, proponents of the navigable waters theory contend that those
other federal and state statutory schemes do not offer comprehensive or
uniform protections for groundwater.108 They argue the CWA’s legislative
history is inconclusive on the question of whether federal authority extends
to some groundwater.109 Representative Aspin’s amendment called for
federal regulation of all groundwater under NPDES and the elimination of an
exemption from the “pollutant” definition for materials injected into wells
during oil and gas production.110 It has been argued that Congress rejected
the amendment because of this exemption and because Congress may have
assumed the statute’s definition of “navigable waters” already encompassed
groundwater, rendering the amendment unnecessary.111
2. The Conduit Theory
The conduit theory, which posits that certain groundwater discharges are
subject to CWA regulation because groundwater can serve as a conduit
between point sources and jurisdictional surface waters, has had more
success. For decades, the EPA regularly applied NPDES permitting
requirements to point source discharges that first travel through groundwater
before reaching surface waters.112 Additionally, many courts endorsed
versions of the conduit theory.113 For instance, in Upstate Forever v. Kinder
Morgan Energy Partners,114 the Fourth Circuit held that the CWA would

107. Id.
108. See Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9, at 338 (“At the state level, regulation varies wildly
among jurisdictions.
These inconsistent protections fail to prevent groundwater
contamination in an interconnected hydrologic system.”); Wood, supra note 9, at 570
(“Though several federal pollution statutes are aimed in part at groundwater protection, much
groundwater falls outside the federal regulatory net.”).
109. See Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9, at 375–76; Philip M. Quatrochi, Comment,
Groundwater Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act: The Tributary Groundwater Dilemma,
23 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 603, 617–18 (1996).
110. Quatrochi, supra note 109, at 617.
111. Id. at 617–18.
112. See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1472 (2020); Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 22, Haw. Wildlife
Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-17447). Note the distinction
between: (1) the EPA regulating discharges that first travel through groundwater before
reaching jurisdictional surface waters, and (2) the EPA regulating discharges into groundwater
because the groundwater is itself a jurisdictional water (what the EPA refused to do under the
Clean Water Rule and WOTUS Rule).
113. See, e.g., Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, 887 F.3d 637, 651–52
(4th Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 2736 (2020), and abrogated by County of Maui, 140 S.
Ct. 1462; County of Maui, 886 F.3d at 749, vacated, 140 S. Ct. 1462; N. Cal. River Watch v.
Mercer Fraser Co., No. C–04–4620, 2005 WL 2122052, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005); Idaho
Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1179–80 (D. Idaho 2001).
114. 887 F.3d 637 (4th Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs brought a citizen suit against the owner of an
underground gasoline pipeline in South Carolina that ruptured. Id. at 641. They alleged that
the released pollutants were seeping from groundwater into nearby tributaries of the Savannah
River and their adjacent wetlands. Id. at 643.
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apply to groundwater discharges from a pipeline where there is a “direct
hydrological connection” to creeks and adjacent wetlands.115 It emphasized
that holding the contrary would undermine the Act’s purpose and its strict
liability regime.116 Notably, it explicitly stated that it was not addressing
whether groundwater itself can be considered “navigable waters” under the
CWA.117 The Ninth Circuit embraced a slightly narrower conduit theory in
Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui.118 It held that an NPDES permit
was required for groundwater discharges from underground injection wells
where the discharged pollutants were “fairly traceable” to the ocean.119 In
its decision, the Ninth Circuit cited to other circuit court decisions applying
standards analogous to the conduit theory.120 Like the Upstate Forever court,
it made clear that it was not deciding whether groundwater is itself
jurisdictional under the CWA.121
Arguments against the conduit theory often stem from federalism
concerns.122 In establishing the CWA’s cooperative federalism framework,
the argument goes, Congress sought to avoid intruding on areas of land and
water use regulation traditionally left to the states.123 Consequently,
Congress placed great emphasis on the role of states in administering and
enforcing the statute, particularly in the realm of non–point source
pollution.124 Any federal regulation of discharges to groundwater would
“compromise this statutory division of labor.”125 In Kentucky Waterways
Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,126 the Sixth Circuit rejected the conduit
theory advanced by the plaintiffs, holding that the CWA did not cover
pollutants traveling from coal ash ponds through groundwater to a nearby
lake.127 It found that the conduit theory was not compatible with the text of

115. See id. at 651–52. After setting forth a “direct hydrological connection” standard, the
court remanded the case for further consideration by the district court. Id. at 653.
116. Id. at 648, 652.
117. Id. at 646 n.5 (“Had the plaintiffs alleged that ground water, of itself, falls within the
meaning of navigable waters under the CWA, we would be confronting a distinctly different
question here.”).
118. 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 1462. For the facts of the case, see
infra Part I.C.
119. Id. at 749.
120. See id. at 747–48 (first citing Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview
Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994); and then citing League of Wilderness Defs./Blue Mountains
Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002)).
121. Id. at 748 (“[W]e do not decide whether groundwater is a ‘navigable water’ under the
statute.”).
122. See Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 905 F.3d 925, 936–37 (6th Cir. 2018),
abrogated by County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462; Schiff, supra note 44, at 468. Such arguments
also apply to the other theories of CWA regulation of groundwater discharges.
123. See Schiff, supra note 44, at 449.
124. See Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 936–37; Schiff, supra note 44, at 456–57.
125. Schiff, supra note 44, at 449.
126. 905 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff environmental groups brought a citizen suit
against a coal-fired power plant owner, asserting that the chemicals in the plant’s coal ash
ponds were contaminating a nearby lake via groundwater. Id. at 928, 930–31.
127. Id. at 932–33.
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the Act128 nor with the CWA’s purpose of preserving significant state
involvement in water pollution regulation.129
In 2019, the EPA changed its long-standing practice of regulating
discharges that are conveyed through groundwater to jurisdictional surface
waters.130 The agency issued an interpretive statement, concluding that the
CWA is best read as excluding all discharges from point sources into
groundwater from NPDES permitting, even when pollutants would
ultimately reach navigable waters.131 The action represented a wholesale
refusal of any theory of groundwater regulation under the Act. However, just
over a year later, the Supreme Court rejected the EPA’s position in County
of Maui.132
C. County of Maui: A “Functional Equivalent” Standard
The issue before the Court in County of Maui was whether § 301(a) of the
CWA covers discharges that travel from a point source to groundwater before
finally being conveyed to a navigable water.133 Since the 1980s, the County
of Maui has operated a wastewater treatment facility134 that pumps up to four
million gallons daily of treated sewage water into underground wells.135 The
effluent136 then travels about a half mile through groundwater until it reaches
the ocean.137 In 2012, environmental groups filed a CWA citizen suit against
the county for discharging pollutants into navigable waters—the Pacific
Ocean—without an NPDES permit.138 The plaintiffs alleged that the
facility’s wastewater discharges had harmed the area’s fragile ecosystem,
citing a letter from the Hawaiʻi Department of Land and Natural Resources
to the EPA that linked the discharges to coral reef degradation and invasive
algal blooms just offshore of the facility.139
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the
environmental groups, although they took slightly different approaches.140
The district court held that the discharge was “functionally one into navigable
water.”141 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the pollutants are “fairly
128. Id. at 934 (interpreting “into navigable waters” as requiring directness).
129. Id. at 937.
130. See Interpretive Statement on Application of the Clean Water Act National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Program to Releases of Pollutants from a Point Source to
Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810 (Apr. 23, 2019) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
131. See id. at 16,811.
132. See infra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
133. County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020).
134. Brief for Petitioner at 6, County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260).
135. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1469.
136. In this context, effluent refers to “waste material . . . discharged into the environment.”
See Effluent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/effluent [https://perma.cc/A777-VTRC] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
137. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1469.
138. Id.
139. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 20, Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County
of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980 (D. Haw. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 12–00198).
140. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1469.
141. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 998.
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traceable” from the point source to a navigable water, the discharge requires
an NPDES permit.142 Other circuit courts described the statutory standard
differently,143 creating a split.
Consistent with its practice, at the time, of regulating discharges that
traveled through groundwater before reaching navigable waters,144 the EPA
supported the plaintiffs County of Maui in the Ninth Circuit.145 However,
the EPA reversed course shortly before the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in 2019.146 Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a brief with
the Supreme Court supporting the County of Maui.147 The county argued
that an NPDES permit is required only where pollutants are delivered from a
point source directly into navigable waters.148
In its interpretation of § 301(a)’s “from any point source” language,149 the
Court declined to apply the Ninth Circuit’s test and the county’s proposed
standard, instead taking a middle ground approach.150 Justice Breyer, writing
for the majority, articulated a new “functional equivalent” test, whereby a
permit is required “if the addition of the pollutants through groundwater is
the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point source into
navigable waters.”151 He enumerated several potentially relevant factors to
consider when making such a determination, including:
(1) transit time, (2) distance traveled, (3) the nature of the material through
which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent to which the pollutant is diluted
or chemically changed as it travels, (5) the amount of pollutant entering the
navigable waters relative to the amount of the pollutant that leaves the point
source, (6) the manner by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable
waters, (7) the degree to which the pollution (at that point) has maintained
its specific identity.152

Time and distance will usually be the most important factors.153

142. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated,
140 S. Ct. 1462; see also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
143. See Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, 887 F.3d 637, 651–52 (4th
Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 2736 (2020), abrogated by County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462;
Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 905 F.3d 925, 933 (6th Cir. 2018), abrogated by County
of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462; see also supra Part I.B.2.
144. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
145. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting PlaintiffsAppellees, supra note 112.
146. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
147. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260). Notably, the U.S. Department of Justice did
not ask the Court to give Chevron deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the CWA. See
County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1474. A discussion of Chevron deference is beyond the scope
of this Note.
148. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 134, at 25.
149. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1470.
150. See id. The Court’s test is arguably relatively similar to the Ninth Circuit’s test, but
Justice Breyer indicated that the majority’s standard is intended to be narrower. Id.
151. Id. at 1468.
152. Id. at 1476–77.
153. Id. at 1477.
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In an attempt to add some shape to this highly fact-sensitive standard,
Justice Breyer added that the permitting requirement clearly applies where a
pipe emitting pollutants ends a few feet from navigable waters and those
pollutants travel through groundwater to reach the navigable waters.154 On
the other hand, if a pipe releases pollutants fifty miles and “many years” away
from a navigable water, a permit is likely not required.155 Acknowledging
that its functional equivalent test would be difficult to apply,156 the majority
suggested that lower courts can help refine the test through individual cases
and the EPA can provide administrative guidance by granting individual
permits, promulgating general permits,157 and developing general rules.158
Justice Breyer also indicated that the CWA’s underlying objectives should
guide determinations, stating that “decisions should not create serious risks
either of undermining state regulation of groundwater or of creating
loopholes that undermine the statute’s basic federal regulatory objectives.”159
While the decision was made in the NPDES permitting context, the majority
opinion did not specify whether the functional equivalent standard ever
applies to discharges of fill or dredged material that come under the § 404
permit program.160
Justice Breyer rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “fairly traceable” test, because
he was concerned that it would allow for federal regulation of discharges that
only reach surface waters “in highly diluted forms” and “many years after
their release.”161 He opined that Congress did not intend for the federal
agencies to hold this kind of general groundwater regulatory authority, citing
Congress’s intent to “leave substantial responsibility and autonomy to the
States” in the realm of groundwater and non-point-source-pollution
regulation.162 However, he also feared risking “interference with the EPA’s
ability to regulate ordinary point source discharges.”163 Justice Breyer noted,
“EPA correctly points out that Congress did not require a permit for all
discharges to groundwater . . . . But there is quite a gap between ‘not all’ and
‘none.’”164 Justice Breyer did not explicitly address whether groundwater
154. See id. at 1476.
155. See id.
156. See id. (“The difficulty with this approach, we recognize, is that it does not, on its
own, clearly explain how to deal with middle instances. But there are too many potentially
relevant factors applicable to factually different cases for this Court now to use more specific
language.”).
157. For an explanation of general permits, see infra notes 223–25 and accompanying text.
158. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1477. The Court also notes that the EPA and the states
can mitigate harms that arise from additional permitting by “developing general permits for
recurring situations or by issuing permits based on best practices where appropriate.” Id.
159. Id.
160. See generally id.
161. Id. at 1470.
162. Id. at 1471–72. Justice Breyer also referenced Representative Aspin’s failed
amendment in the Act’s legislative history, suggesting that it shows Congress did not intend
to give the federal government full authority to regulate groundwater as a category of
jurisdictional waters. Id. at 1472.
163. Id. at 1473.
164. Id. at 1474.
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ever falls under “waters of the United States,”165 and he made no mention of
the Trump administration’s WOTUS Rule, issued just two days before the
Court’s decision,166 or the Obama-era Clean Water Rule.167
Justice Breyer described the EPA’s “longstanding regulatory practice” of
applying the CWA’s permitting provisions to point source discharges that are
conveyed through groundwater to traditionally navigable waters.168 Yet, he
noted that the agency has refused to exercise authority over discharges that
reach groundwater only after lengthy periods, reflecting a narrower
interpretation than the Ninth Circuit’s “fairly traceable” test.169
Justice Breyer also rejected the position that the EPA took up before the
Court and in its 2019 interpretive statement,170 reasoning that the position
could not be reconciled with the statute’s structure, purposes, or text.171
“[T]o follow EPA’s reading would open a loophole allowing easy evasion of
the statutory provision’s basic purposes. Such an interpretation is neither
persuasive nor reasonable.”172
In a concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh stated that the Court’s opinion
adheres to Justice Scalia’s interpretation of “from any point source” in his
Rapanos plurality opinion.173 Justice Kavanaugh cited Justice Scalia’s
reasoning that “polluters could not ‘evade the permitting requirement of
§ 1342(a) simply by discharging their pollutants into noncovered intermittent
watercourses that lie upstream of covered waters.’”174 Justice Kavanaugh
also defended any vagueness in the functional equivalent standard,
emphasizing that it is a product of the statute’s imprecise statutory text.175
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented to say that the
majority’s standard departs from both the statutory text176 and Congress’s
intent to reserve responsibility to regulate non–point sources of pollution,
like groundwater, to the states.177 Justice Thomas also criticized the Court
for failing to provide adequate guidance in its explanation of the factors
relevant to a functional equivalent determination.178
165. Cf. supra notes 117, 121 and accompanying text (explaining that the Fourth Circuit
and Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that they were not deciding whether groundwater itself can
be considered “navigable waters” under the CWA).
166. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
168. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1472 (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822,
832 (7th Cir. 1977)).
169. Id. (citing McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Cheney, 763 F. Supp.
431, 437 (E.D. Cal. 1989)).
170. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
171. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1475.
172. Id. at 1474.
173. Id. at 1478 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
174. Id. (quoting Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742–43 (2006)).
175. See id.
176. Id. at 1479 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Based on the statutory text and structure, I would
hold that a permit is required only when a point source discharges pollutants directly into
navigable waters.”).
177. Id. at 1480.
178. See id. at 1481.
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In a separate dissent, Justice Alito rebuked the Court for not providing
clear guidance for the regulated community, permitting agencies, and lower
courts.179 He wrote that the majority “adopts a nebulous standard,
enumerates a non-exhaustive list of potentially relevant factors, and washes
its hands of the problem.”180 According to Justice Alito, the best
interpretation of the statute is that it requires a permit only when pollutants
are discharged directly from a point source to navigable waters.181 He
reasoned that this interpretation would not lead to “the sort of extreme
consequences that the Court finds unacceptable,” because “point source” is
defined broadly in the statute to include land features such as ditches and
channels.182
II. UNCERTAINTY AFTER COUNTY OF MAUI
This part identifies two problems that emerge from the majority and
concurring opinions in County of Maui. First, the meaning of functional
equivalent and the range of scenarios that will meet the Court’s standard are
unclear.183 This uncertainty may lead to inconsistent applications of the
functional equivalent standard in lower courts, generating confusion for
owners of facilities that discharge into groundwater and for groups seeking
to enforce the CWA against polluting entities.184 Second, and less obviously,
the Court did not clearly frame its standard as a version of the conduit theory
or the navigable waters theory.185 While the functional equivalent test seems
to align more with the conduit theory, there is some latent ambiguity.186 The
EPA, the Corps, and lower courts are left to navigate this uncertainty and
perhaps clarify how County of Maui fits within the full context of the CWA
regulatory landscape.
A. A Murky Test
While County of Maui was celebrated as a win for environmentalists,187
just how far the CWA’s protections reach remains unclear. The Court
outlined seven factors to consider in determining whether a discharge
through groundwater is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from
a point source into navigable waters, but it only specified how two of the
factors should be weighed.188 It also provided two examples to illustrate how
179. See id. at 1483 (Alito, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1491.
181. Id. at 1486.
182. See id. at 1486–87.
183. See infra Part II.A.
184. See infra Part II.A.
185. See infra Part II.B.
186. See infra Part II.B.
187. See Richard Frank, Here Today, Gone to Maui, LEGAL PLANET (Apr. 25, 2020),
https://legal-planet.org/2020/04/25/here-today-gone-to-maui/
[https://perma.cc/9HTVWK9R]; Jessica A. Knoblauch & Maggie Caldwell, The Clean Water Case of the Century,
EARTHJUSTICE (Apr. 23, 2020), https://earthjustice.org/features/supreme-court-maui-cleanwater-case [https://perma.cc/3YP5-LSEQ].
188. See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1476–77 (2020).
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the test should be applied.189 However, these illustrations do little to clarify
the test, as they only explain what the outcome should be in the most extreme
cases.190 Even then, the Court only went so far as to say that a permit is
“likely” not required if a point source releases a discharge fifty miles and
“many years” away from navigable waters.191 Moreover, the majority did
not provide clear guidance regarding how lower courts should balance the
CWA’s objectives of protecting water quality and preserving states’
traditional authority to regulate groundwater pollution.192 While it
emphasized the importance of both goals, the Court did not advise how each
should be weighed.193
Justice Breyer was the first to acknowledge that the majority’s functional
equivalent test does not provide particularly helpful guidance on how to deal
with “middle instances,”194 and he passed off the job of clarifying the test to
the EPA and the lower courts.195 Justice Kavanaugh also admitted that the
standard is less than clear,196 and Justice Alito sharply criticized the majority
for failing to give the regulated community and other stakeholders adequate
guidance.197 Industry critics have echoed this sentiment, lamenting the lack
of a bright-line rule for industries that discharge any type of water pollution
into groundwater.198
The EPA issued a guidance memorandum on January 14, 2021, to provide
guidance to regulated entities and permitting agencies on applying County of
Maui in the NPDES permitting context.199 In the guidance, the EPA
identified an additional factor that the agency said should be considered in a
functional equivalent analysis: “the design and performance of the system
or facility from which the pollutant is released.”200 The addition of this factor
represents a narrow interpretation of the functional equivalent test, since the
EPA suggests that the test likely will not be met where a facility treats or
abates its pollutant discharges before they enter groundwater.201 However,
189. See id. at 1476.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
194. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1476.
195. See id. at 1477.
196. See id. at 1478 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
197. See id. at 1483 (Alito, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., Gilmer & Saiyid, supra note 21.
199. Guidance Memorandum from Anna Wildeman, Acting Assistant Adm’r, U.S. Env’t
Prot. Agency, on Applying the Supreme Court’s County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund
Decision in the Clean Water Act Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System Permit Program (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/202101/documents/final_ow_maui_guidance_document_-_signed_1.14.21.pdf [https://perma.cc
/82HW-MY9C].
200. Id. at 7.
201. See id. at 8. A number of states and environmental groups criticized the guidance in
its draft form. See State Energy & Env’t Impact Ctr, Twelve AGs Filed Comments Criticizing
EPA Guidance on Implementation of Supreme Court’s Maui Clean Water Act Decision, NYU
SCH. OF L. (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/state-impact/ag-actions/twelveags-filed-comments-criticizing-epa-guidance-implementation
[https://perma.cc/K2UX-
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the future of the guidance under President Joe Biden’s administration is
uncertain.202 While lower courts have begun to review cases that were put
on hold pending the outcome of County of Maui,203 consensus on how the
functional equivalent test should be applied likely will not develop for some
time, given the fact-sensitive, case-specific nature of the test. How broadly
courts and federal agencies construe the standard is important, because it will
affect the level of enforcement that dischargers face and the range of legal
options available to citizen groups seeking to sue polluting facilities.
1. Potential Consequences for NPDES Enforcement
Where an owner or operator of a point source that discharges pollutants
(excluding fill and dredged material) into jurisdictional waters is in violation
of § 301(a), they may be subject to strict liability civil penalties,204
administrative penalties,205 and an order to bring them into compliance under
the NPDES permitting scheme.206 This includes unpermitted owners and
operators, as well as owners and operators who have an NPDES permit for
their facilities but who nonetheless engage in unauthorized discharge or who
violate the terms of their permits.207 Violators may also be subject to
criminal penalties.208 Civil penalties can reach up to $55,800 per day,209
while criminal penalties can range from $2500 to $100,000 per day.210
“[T]he threat of unlawful discharge and permit violation enforcement cases,
with their strict liability civil penalties, promotes compliance with Section
301(a) of the Act.”211
Under the County of Maui standard, if a point source discharge into
groundwater is found to be the functional equivalent of a direct discharge
into jurisdictional waters and it falls under the NPDES permitting scheme,
the main practical consequence is that the owner or operator of that point
source will be required to obtain a permit from the EPA containing effluent
9N4K]; Hannah Northey & Pamela King, Leaked Draft: EPA Aims to Clarify Supreme Court
Maui Ruling, E&E NEWS (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063719841
[https://perma.cc/FW9J-W5A7].
202. See Northey & King, supra note 201.
203. See, e.g., Conservation L. Found., Inc. v. Longwood Venues & Destinations, Inc., No.
20-1024, 2020 WL 6111192, at *1 (1st Cir. Oct. 14, 2020); Prairie Rivers Network v. Dynegy
Midwest Generation, LLC, 976 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2020).
204. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (“Any person who violates section 301 . . . of this Act . . . or any
permit condition or limitation . . . in a permit issued under section 402 of this Act . . . shall be
subject to a civil penalty . . . .”).
205. Id. § 1319(g).
206. Id. § 1319(a).
207. See id.; David Drelich, Restoring the Cornerstone of the Clean Water Act, 34 COLUM.
J. ENV’T L. 267, 321 (2009).
208. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
209. Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 1751, 1754 (proposed
Jan. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 19).
210. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c); see also Criminal Provisions of Water Pollution, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/criminal-provisions-water-pollution
[https://perma.cc/
Y3J8-KYCU] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
211. Drelich, supra note 207, at 326.
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limitations and requirements for water monitoring and reporting.212 The
permit will require the owner or operator to implement mandated technology
applicable to the category of industry to which the facility belongs in order
to meet the permit’s effluent limitations.213 While it is possible that
dischargers will be required to stop activity,214 injunctive relief is not
commonly available.215 Dischargers will also be subject to any civil or
criminal penalties assessed against them.216 While these consequences
represent some costs, they are generally not so burdensome as to be project
prohibitive for the average discharger.217
If the functional equivalent standard is narrowly construed such that a
permit is only required when pollutants travel briefly and for a short distance
through groundwater, citizen groups seeking enforcement against entities
that send discharges into groundwater would have to turn more frequently to
state regulatory programs.218 Where there is no state enforcement
mechanism for groundwater discharges,219 these groups will be out of luck
unless another federal statute applies, such as the SDWA or RCRA. This
would make it much more difficult for nongovernmental stakeholders to
secure desired remedies against polluters using the CWA’s citizen suit
provision.220
On the other hand, if courts find that the functional equivalent standard is
met in a wide range of scenarios, citizen groups will have more options for
suing over groundwater pollution.221 However, even with a broadly
applicable test, the scope of liability for those who violate § 301(a) is still
uncertain to some extent. The majority in County of Maui explained that
judges can “mitigate any hardship or injustice when they apply the statute’s
penalty provision” and should “exercise their discretion mindful . . . of the
complexities inherent to the context of indirect discharges through
212. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a); see also NPDES Permit Basics, supra note 35.
213. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b), 1317, 1342(a).
214. Id. § 1319(b).
215. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 753, 765 (E.D. Va.
2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 903 F.3d 403 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Injunctive relief—especially
mandatory injunctive relief—is a ‘drastic and extraordinary’ remedy, available only in unusual
situations.” (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010))).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 204–10.
217. See Erin Belka & Sarah Kern, Assessing Civil Penalties in Clean Water Act Citizen
Suit Cases, 10 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 71, 83–84 (2003).
218. See Andrew Bittner et al., Carving Out the Contours: The Clean Water Act and the
Migration of Affected Groundwater to Waters of the United States, FOR DEF., June 2019, at
55, 59 (citing Frank S. Hollerman III, S. Env’t L. Ctr., Comment on Clean Water Act Coverage
of “Discharges of Pollutants” via a Direct Hydrologic Connection to Surface Water 18 (Apr.
18, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0063-0066 [https://
perma.cc/APQ7-S58U]).
219. State regulation of discharges into groundwater varies significantly. See THOMSON
REUTERS, supra note 105. Some states regulate groundwater discharges as part of their
administration of the NPDES program, while others regulate such discharges under state laws,
see Blumm & Thiel, supra note 9, at 341, which may or may not contain a citizen suit
provision.
220. See Bittner et al., supra note 218, at 59.
221. See supra note 13.
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groundwater, so as to calibrate the Act’s penalties when, for example, a party
could reasonably have thought that a permit was not required.”222 Depending
on how lower courts heed the majority’s advice, many dischargers may be
newly subject to NPDES permitting requirements while free from significant
financial consequences beyond the cost of implementing technology. In
other words, the current law could result in a broadly applicable test that has
limited bite.
Further, the EPA has the authority to issue general permits, which, like
individual NPDES permits, may contain enforceable effluent limitations.223
However, general permits are issued for particular categories of activities and
may apply to a variety of point sources discharging into different waters.224
Dischargers seeking coverage under general permits are typically required to
submit only a notice of intent to their permitting agencies, providing
information about the planned discharge and expressing their intent to be
covered under a general permit.225 While the adequacy of the general permit
program to protect water quality and implement the objectives of the CWA
has been subject to criticism,226 the Court in County of Maui encouraged the
EPA to promulgate such permits as a way of guiding the application of the
functional equivalent standard.227 If the functional equivalent test is
interpreted broadly by courts, perhaps the EPA will be more likely to create
general permits as a way of accommodating the potentially numerous
dischargers that may become subject to the NPDES permitting program. The
generic nature of these permits is less than ideal from an environmentally
protective standpoint,228 but general permits at least require some degree of
pollution mitigation and compliance with effluent standards.229 Moreover, a
general permit is subject to review every five years,230 so it would guarantee
more water resource protection than would no permit at all.
2. Potential Consequences for § 404 Enforcement
Although it is not entirely clear to what extent, if at all, the functional
equivalent test applies in the § 404 permitting context,231 it is worth
222. County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1477 (2020).
223. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(3) (2020); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES
General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 409, 411 (2007).
224. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.28; Gaba, supra note 223, at 411.
225. NPDES Permit Basics, supra note 35.
226. See, e.g., Gaba, supra note 223, at 411 (“How, for example, can a general permit,
applicable to a wide variety of sources discharging into different bodies of water, adequately
comply with the inherently site-specific requirements to ensure attainment of state water
quality standards?”).
227. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1477 (“EPA, too, can provide administrative guidance
(within statutory boundaries) in numerous ways, including through, for example . . .
promulgation of general permits . . . .”).
228. See supra note 226.
229. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(3).
230. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B).
231. As mentioned in Part I.C, the majority in County of Maui did not specify whether the
test ever applies to discharges of fill or dredged material that come under the § 404 permitting
program. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. Perhaps the Court failed to appreciate
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exploring what the ramifications would be. Under the § 404 permitting
program, a permit from the Corps is required for the discharge of fill or
dredged material into jurisdictional waters, including some wetlands.232 The
statute authorizes the EPA, after consulting with the Corps, to deny permits
where the discharge would have an “unacceptable adverse effect on
municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including
spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.”233
Additionally, the implementing regulations require that there be no
“practicable alternative” to the proposed discharge in order for a permit to be
granted.234 This provision represents a much higher standard than that under
the NPDES permitting scheme, which has no such requirement. Thus, if
discharges of fill or dredged material meet the functional equivalent standard,
the practical consequences for the discharger may be much greater, since it
is more likely that an activity may be prohibited altogether. With regard to
civil and criminal penalties, the same provisions apply to both § 402 and
§ 404 permit violators.235
If the functional equivalent test is narrowly construed by courts, it may not
cover many § 404 discharges due to the nature of fill and dredged material.236
However, if the test is interpreted to encompass a broad range of scenarios,
it may have a substantial limiting effect on activity covered by § 404,
including filling wetlands. Dischargers that have released fill or dredged
material prior to applying for a permit could also face civil and even criminal
penalties,237 although the size of these penalties is subject to judicial
discretion.238
B. The Navigable Waters Theory: Still on the Table?
The uncertainty created by County of Maui is also partly a product of the
Court’s failure to clearly frame its holding in relation to the navigable waters
theory. Under the functional equivalent test, discharges from a point source
through groundwater may be subject to the CWA’s permitting scheme if they
ultimately reach navigable waters.239 The standard can certainly be viewed
as a recognition that regulating point source pollution to jurisdictional surface
the distinction between the CWA’s two permitting programs, or perhaps it assumed its holding
would only ever apply to chemical pollution. It is generally understood that nonsolid and
chemical pollutants are more likely to be conveyed over some distance through groundwater
than solid pollutants, such as fill and dredged material. See Drelich, supra note 207, at 327
(“The foreseeability of liquid pollutants reaching a receiving water appears much greater, in
most circumstances, than that of solid pollutants, and the probability of a discharge is
correspondingly much higher.”). Because of this reality, it is unclear how often—if ever—
courts will end up applying the functional equivalent test to discharges of fill and dredged
material.
232. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
233. Id. § 1344(c).
234. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2020).
235. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)–(d).
236. See supra note 231.
237. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
239. See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020).

2021]

CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION

2797

waters necessarily entails regulating some discharges that first pass through
groundwater, consistent with the conduit theory.240 However, the decision
may also be interpreted—and has been interpreted by a number of
commentators241—as an acknowledgment that, in some but not all cases,
groundwater comes under the EPA and the Corps’s authority to regulate
“waters of the United States.”242
Whether the Court opened the door to a navigable waters theory of
groundwater regulation is ambiguous in the opinion’s text. Justice Breyer
did not discuss how the Court’s holding relates to the line of cases
interpreting “waters of the United States,” other than to mention a comment
from Justice Scalia’s plurality in Rapanos regarding how the word “from”
should be interpreted.243 Justice Breyer did not need to address those cases
since they focused specifically on whether certain wetlands were “waters of
the United States,” a different question about the scope of CWA
jurisdiction.244 Nevertheless, the fractured Rapanos decision has particular
relevance for groundwater, since Justice Kennedy’s concurrence can be read
as compatible with the navigable waters theory.245 Additionally, unlike some
lower courts,246 Justice Breyer did not explicitly say that County of Maui
does not address the question of whether groundwater can be considered
“waters of the United States.” Moreover, Justice Breyer did not address
whether the decision has implications for the federal agencies’ categorical
exclusion of groundwater from their definition of “waters of the United
States.”247 Consequently, it is unclear how County of Maui relates to
Rapanos and the WOTUS Rule.

240. See supra Part I.B.2.
241. See Alejandro E. Camacho & Melissa Kelly, The Shape of Water After County of
Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, REGUL. REV. (July 28, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org
/2020/07/28/camacho-kelly-shape-water-after-county-maui [https://perma.cc/B4ZQ-A8XM]
(“[T]he Administration’s changes to the EPA’s definition of what qualifies as a protected
water would exclude water bodies clearly included under the Court’s interpretation of
protected waters as delineated in County of Maui.”); Thomas Griffin & Elizabeth Howard,
Another “New” Era: WOTUS Rule 2020—Update, JD SUPRA (July 29, 2020), https://www.
jdsupra.com/legalnews/another-new-era-wotus-rule-2020-update-16662
[https://perma.cc
/X37J-ZE5Q] (“[A]ccording to the Supreme Court, in at least some cases, groundwater will
fall under the jurisdiction of the CWA, whereas the 2020 [WOTUS] Rule states that
groundwater is completely excluded from CWA jurisdiction. This direct contradiction will
need to be further addressed by the EPA, or interested parties will seek to address it through
litigation.”); see also Kevin P. Holewinski et al., Supreme Court Rules Some Discharges to
Groundwater Require Clean Water Act Permits, JONES DAY (Apr. 2020), https://www.
jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/04/supreme-court-rules-some-discharges-to-groundwaterrequire-clean-water-act-permits [https://perma.cc/C63E-5MB5].
242. See supra Part I.B.1.
243. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1475.
244. See supra Part I.B.1.
245. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 117, 121 and accompanying text (explaining that the Fourth Circuit
and Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that they were not deciding whether groundwater itself can
be considered “navigable waters” under the CWA).
247. See supra notes 84–87, 91–92 and accompanying text.
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Unlike the majority, Justice Kavanaugh did address the decision’s
relationship to Rapanos in his concurrence.248 Because Justice Kavanaugh
believed the County of Maui holding accords with Justice Scalia’s plurality
opinion in Rapanos,249 it would seem that he viewed groundwater as merely
a conduit and never a jurisdictional water under the CWA.250 Further, the
current WOTUS Rule was based on Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion.251
Perhaps this indicates that Justice Kavanaugh would understand County of
Maui to be compatible with the WOTUS Rule and its categorical exclusion
of groundwater. However, Justice Kavanaugh wrote only for himself, so his
concurrence does not clearly resolve the latent ambiguity left by the
majority’s decision. With no other words on the matter from the Court,
Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion could signal that a challenge to the WOTUS
Rule’s exclusion of groundwater would likely not succeed.
This uncertainty has practical implications. If County of Maui is
understood as saying that some groundwater can be regulated as “waters of
the United States” on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the navigable
waters theory, the decision would directly conflict with the position the
Trump administration staked out in its WOTUS Rule.252 Some practitioners
and commentators have already characterized the decision this way.253
States and citizen groups challenging the WOTUS Rule in court254 could
argue that the agencies’ categorical exclusion of groundwater from the
“waters of the United States” definition is untenable after County of Maui.
They might call for the inclusion of groundwater in a middle, case-specific
category similar to the case-specific significant nexus category established in
the Clean Water Rule.255 Creation of such a category would begin a new
chapter—focused on groundwater rather than wetlands—in the decades-long
“waters of the United States” saga.256 Litigation would surely ensue, since
extending jurisdictional status over groundwater would implicate the
federalism concerns that have driven much of the past disagreement over the
scope of the CWA.257 Federal agencies, wishing to avoid arguments that
they are frustrating Congress’s intent to preserve states’ traditional authority
248. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1478 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also supra
text accompanying notes 173–74.
249. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1478 (Kavanaugh, J. concurring); see also supra
note 173 and accompanying text.
250. Because Justice Scalia concluded that a surface water connection is required for a
nontraditionally navigable water to be jurisdictional, groundwater cannot be included under
his standard.
251. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. This would also conflict with the agencies’
prior position in the Clean Water Rule, which also categorically excluded groundwater. See
supra note 87 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
254. See generally Pamela King & Hannah Northey, Who’s Suing Over Trump’s WOTUS
Rule?, E&E NEWS (June 24, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063446011 [https://
perma.cc/B6M9-9JPZ].
255. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
256. See Ramirez, supra note 29, at 165. See generally Sapp et al., supra note 49.
257. See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
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to regulate groundwater and non–point source pollution,258 may be reluctant
to assert jurisdiction over groundwater in such an explicit way.
On the other hand, if County of Maui is understood as saying that
groundwater functions only as a conduit and is never a jurisdictional water,
the decision may be compatible with the WOTUS Rule. Excluding
groundwater from the definition of “waters of the United States” does not
necessarily preclude the regulation of discharges through groundwater into
waters that are deemed to be “waters of the United States.”259 This framing
would make the success of any legal challenges to the WOTUS Rule’s
exclusion of groundwater much less likely.
For the moment, it remains unclear whether County of Maui and the
WOTUS Rule are in conflict. Perhaps this ambiguity was intentional, and
the Court wished to leave it as an open question for the agencies and lower
courts, or perhaps the Court simply did not articulate its intended framing
clearly. Perhaps it is the latter, given that Justice Breyer referenced the
decades of EPA practice applying the CWA’s permitting provisions to
groundwater discharges that reach navigable waters and implied that the
Court’s standard is narrower.260 Regardless, if left unresolved, confusion
over the scope of federal protections for water resources will remain.
III. A SIGNIFICANT NEXUS OVERLAY TO BRING COUNTY OF MAUI INTO
FOCUS
The latent ambiguity of the County of Maui decision and the fact-specific
nature of the functional equivalent test leave lower courts and permitting
agencies with an unenviable task. The ways in which they frame the Court’s
holding and begin to define the test’s boundaries will shape the next chapter
of discourse regarding “waters of the United States” and how groundwater
discharges are regulated.261 More saliently, these decisions will have
significant implications for regulated entities seeking to understand liability
risks and environmental groups weighing the costs and benefits of pursuing
citizen suits under the CWA.262 The future of the test will also affect the
health of the nation’s water resources and the ecosystems, communities, and
economies that depend on them.
This part proposes that the significant nexus test articulated in Justice
Kennedy’s Rapanos concurrence263 can offer guidance to lower courts
applying the County of Maui standard. As discussed above, Justice Breyer
did not provide instructions about how to weigh the seven factors that he said
may be relevant to a functional equivalent determination, beyond prioritizing
time and distance.264 Further, his instructions for considering the CWA’s
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 249–51 and accompanying text.
See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1472–73 (2020).
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.A.
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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policy objectives in a functional equivalent analysis are ambiguous.265
Consequently, when a court encounters a case where the seven factors point
in different directions, County of Maui offers no clear answer about whether
the discharge meets the functional equivalent standard. The court will be left
to do its own balancing of the Act’s broad goal of protecting the nation’s
water resources through federal regulation and Congress’s intent to preserve
state authority over groundwater pollution.
Overlaying Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus standard on the functional
equivalent test in such cases would help courts strike the correct balance.
Under this approach, a court would ask whether the discharge that is arriving
to surface waters after passing through groundwater “significantly affect[s]
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of the receiving waters.266
If the answer is yes, the court should conclude that the County of Maui test
is satisfied: the discharge is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge
into navigable waters. By focusing the inquiry on the discharge’s effects on
the integrity of navigable waters, it would ensure that courts do not stray from
the Act’s overarching objective of restoring and maintaining the integrity of
the nation’s waters.267
To understand the potential utility of a significant nexus overlay approach,
it is helpful to first compare the functional equivalent test and Justice
Kennedy’s significant nexus test. Part III.A highlights the differences and
similarities between the two standards and the opinions from which they are
drawn. Part III.B then discusses the advantages and possible pitfalls of an
overlay approach, briefly touching on how the approach may resolve some
of the tension generated by the Court’s failure to address whether
groundwater ever constitutes “waters of the United States.” Finally, Part
III.C considers some alternative approaches to applying the functional
equivalent test and argues that the overlay approach is both more practical
for all parties involved and more consistent with the CWA’s purpose of
protecting the nation’s water resources.
A. Comparing the Significant Nexus and Functional Equivalent Standards
It is important to start by noting the different physical circumstances that
the significant nexus test and functional equivalent test were designed to
address. In Rapanos, the Court was asked to decide whether development
activity that involved filling wetlands should be subject to § 404 permitting
requirements because the wetlands were “waters of the United States.”268
Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus standard aimed to require a permit where
wetlands—and therefore, any filling activity in those wetlands—significantly
impacted the health of hydrologically connected navigable waters.269 On the
other hand, in County of Maui, the Court was concerned with discharges of
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See generally Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
See id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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chemical pollution into groundwater, where the discharger knew that the
effluent would end up in the Pacific Ocean.270 The Court held that such
discharges, if found to be the functional equivalent of direct discharges into
the ocean, would be subject to NPDES permitting requirements.271 The two
physical scenarios are distinguished by the nature of the discharge272 and the
type of water into which it is directly discharged. The two legal standards
differ in which statutory term—“waters of the United States” and “from any
point source”—they seek to define.
Despite these differences, Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test
embodies many of the same goals as the functional equivalent test. Justice
Kennedy called for CWA regulation of wetlands where wetlands “either
alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region,
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of
traditionally navigable waters.273 He indicated that the quantity and
regularity of water flow in the tributaries connecting a wetland to
traditionally navigable waters may be important factors in a significant nexus
analysis.274 Justice Breyer similarly emphasized that CWA jurisdiction over
discharges through groundwater is dependent on a variety of hydrological
factors, including time, distance, and the nature of the material through which
the pollution travels.275 Both opinions acknowledged the interconnectivity
of water features and demonstrate an understanding of hydrological
principles.276 They recognized that the characteristics of tributaries and
groundwater systems may vary, thus affecting the ways in which pollutants
are conveyed between point sources and surface waters.
Further, under both tests, the existence of a hydrological connection
between the water directly receiving the discharge from a point source and
navigable waters is necessary but not sufficient for CWA coverage. For
Justice Kennedy, CWA jurisdiction attaches only when wetlands
“significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of
navigable waters.277 He also noted that if a wetland’s effects on downstream
water quality are “speculative or insubstantial,” it cannot be considered
within “waters of the United States.”278 In County of Maui, Justice Breyer
raised similar kinds of concerns in his rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s “fairly
traceable” standard,279 although his focus on downstream effects is less
explicit. According to Justice Breyer, the “fairly traceable” standard would
270. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 134, at 13 (“[T]he 1973 pre-construction
environmental impact report . . . explained that injected effluent would ‘eventually reach the
ocean.’”). See generally County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).
271. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1468.
272. Because the nature of the discharge differs, the relevant permitting scheme under the
CWA also differs. See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text.
273. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
274. See id. at 786.
275. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1476–77.
276. See id. at 1470, 1476; Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
277. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780.
278. Id.
279. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1470–71.
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allow for federal regulation of discharges that only reach traditionally
navigable waters “in highly diluted forms” and “many years after their
release.”280 His reasoning suggests that CWA regulation is appropriate only
where upstream water pollution has at least a relatively substantial impact on
downstream navigable waters. The language of the functional equivalent test
itself also reflects a concern with the effects that discharges have on
navigable waters.281
Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer also both recognized the need to
balance the CWA’s purpose of protecting the nation’s waters and its policy
of preserving states’ traditional regulatory authority over groundwater
pollution,282 but only Justice Kennedy clearly explained how his standard
does so. Justice Kennedy indicated that the significant nexus determination
should be guided by Congress’s goal of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”283 He
acknowledged that his test does not fit neatly within the traditional zone of
federal authority but states that it “does not raise federalism . . . concerns
sufficient to support a presumption against its adoption.”284 Criticizing the
Rapanos plurality’s standard, he contends that requiring permanent or
continuously flowing water, as the plurality does, is impractical in light of
the statute’s goal of protecting downstream water quality.285
It is less clear where Justice Breyer struck the balance, but he did express
an unwillingness to allow the CWA’s commitment to preserving states’
traditional regulatory authority to undermine the statute’s main goal of
protecting the integrity of jurisdictional waters. He rejected the EPA’s
position that discharges through groundwater are never subject to CWA
permitting requirements, reasoning that it would allow easy evasion of the
statute’s basic federal regulatory objectives.286 Further, he stated that
“Congress did not require a permit for all discharges to groundwater . . . .
But there is quite a gap between ‘not all’ and ‘none.’”287 Similar to Justice
Kennedy in Rapanos, Justice Breyer seemed to suggest that preserving the
Act’s cooperative federalism framework does not require a total absence of
federal oversight over water pollution that was traditionally left to the states
to regulate.
Despite the fact that they were articulated in response to different physical
conditions and slightly different jurisdictional questions, the significant
nexus and functional equivalent tests seem to approach CWA jurisdiction in
280. Id. at 1470.
281. See Damien M. Schiff & Glenn E. Roper, The Hallmarks of a Good Test: A Proposal
for Applying the “Functional Equivalent” Rule from County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund,
38 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2020) (explaining that other court decisions using functional
equivalent or “functionally similar” standards focus on the effect of an action).
282. See supra notes 27, 30 and accompanying text.
283. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)).
284. Id. at 782.
285. See id. at 769.
286. See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474–75 (2020).
287. Id. at 1474.
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parallel ways. Their similarities support the use of Justice Kennedy’s test to
illuminate Justice Breyer’s, particularly where Justice Breyer’s test lacks
shape.
B. Evaluating the Utility of an Overlay Approach
While not a perfect solution to a vague test, a significant nexus overlay
approach has benefits. It would help prevent lower courts from applying the
functional equivalent test more narrowly than the County of Maui Court
intended.288 It would also create consistency for courts and regulated
entities, which is particularly important in light of the uncertain future of the
WOTUS Rule under a new presidential administration.289 Finally, it offers
a practical way of ensuring that lower court decisions do not disturb the
CWA’s cooperative federalism framework.290
1. Alignment with County of Maui
Overlaying Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test on the functional
equivalent test would help ensure that the latter is not applied too narrowly.
If the functional equivalent test is found to be satisfied only where Justice
Breyer’s seven factors clearly indicate that the groundwater discharge is the
functional equivalent of a direct discharge—for instance, where transit time
is short and distance traveled is small—it would only prevent the creation of
“large and obvious loophole[s]” in the Act.291 The Court certainly meant to
do more when it instructed lower courts to avoid “serious risks . . . of creating
loopholes that undermine the statute’s basic federal regulatory objectives.”292
Justice Breyer further suggested that a narrow application was not intended
through his illustration of how the factors operate in extreme scenarios.293
Justice Breyer stated that where a pipe releases pollutants into groundwater
fifty miles from navigable waters, and the pollutants mix with “much other
material” and only reach the navigable waters “many years later,” the Act’s
permitting requirements “likely do not apply.”294 His use of “likely”
indicates that the Court did not necessarily expect a discharge to look exactly
the same at the time it arrives to navigable waters as it did when it left the
point source. It allows for the possibility that Justice Breyer’s factors might
point in different directions, or even lean toward a “no” finding, yet the
functional equivalent standard could still be met if the pollutants seriously
harmed the downstream navigable waters. A significant nexus overlay
accounts for this complexity by focusing a court’s attention on the impacts
of a discharge.

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.3.
County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1473.
Id. at 1477.
See id. at 1476.
Id. (emphasis added).
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By preventing courts from applying the functional equivalent test too
narrowly, the overlay approach would preserve opportunities for
nongovernmental stakeholders to seek enforcement measures against
groundwater polluters using the CWA’s citizen suit provision.295 This would
provide important consistency in the context of a patchwork of state
regulation.296
2. Consistency for Courts and Regulated Entities
The overlay approach would also promote consistency in the way that
lower courts around the country apply the functional equivalent test. Since
Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus standard more explicitly asks about
effects on navigable waters, overlaying that standard on the functional
equivalent test in cases where the County of Maui factors do not point in a
clear direction helps sharpen the analysis. If courts ask whether a given
groundwater discharge “significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity”297 of navigable waters, they will have a more
straightforward way to make determinations in what the County of Maui
Court calls “middle instances.”298 As a result, determinations under the
functional equivalent test will be more consistent across jurisdictions, giving
regulated entities greater predictability.
Predictability for regulated entities is especially important given that the
scope of “waters of the United States” remains unsettled.299 The fractured
Rapanos decision provided no clear controlling standard for determining
which waters are jurisdictional,300 and the Trump administration’s WOTUS
Rule faces an uncertain future due to litigation301 and a new
administration.302 Moreover, County of Maui generated confusion about
whether its holding stands in conflict with the agencies’ categorical exclusion
of groundwater from “waters of the United States.”303 The significant nexus
overlay approach is useful here. Its application likely provides the same or
similar protection for groundwater and surface waters that would be provided
under a navigable waters theory—where groundwater is considered
jurisdictional if it shares a significant nexus with traditionally navigable
waters.304 In other words, the group of dischargers subject to CWA
permitting requirements under the overlay approach would be unlikely to
differ significantly from the group of dischargers subject to permitting
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Cf. supra notes 218–20 and accompanying text.
See supra note 219.
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See supra note 156.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
See King & Northey, supra note 254.
See Hannah Northey, How Biden Could Undo Trump’s Water Regulations, E&E
NEWS (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063718667 [https://perma.cc
/XD6M-8B6S].
303. See supra Part II.B.
304. See supra Part I.B.1.
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because of a broader “waters of the United States” definition. Therefore, if
the EPA and the Corps were to replace the WOTUS Rule with a rule that no
longer categorically excludes groundwater from “waters of the United
States,” dischargers would not experience much of a practical difference at
the permitting level.
3. No Disruption to the Cooperative Federalism Framework
The County of Maui majority recognized that Congress intended to
preserve state regulation of groundwater and other non–point sources of
pollution in the CWA,305 emphasizing that courts should not jeopardize this
goal in making “functional equivalent” determinations.306 A “significant
nexus” overlay approach accounts for this concern.
The overlay approach protects against intrusions on state regulation of
groundwater by requiring a permit only where (1) Justice Breyer’s factors do
not clearly point toward a “no functional equivalence” finding, and (2)
pollution from a point source significantly affects the water quality of surface
water bodies. Because the focus is on the impact of point source pollution
on surface waters, not groundwater, the approach does not impinge on states’
ability to regulate groundwater and non–point source pollution. Although it
embodies a relatively broad approach to applying the functional equivalent
test, the overlay approach is still narrower than the Ninth Circuit’s fairly
traceable test,307 which the Court rejected in County of Maui because it would
interfere with states’ traditional regulatory authority.308 Unlike the fairly
traceable test, the overlay approach requires more than mere evidence that
pollutants are traceable from a point source to surface waters via groundwater
and, again, the focus is on whether jurisdictional surface waters are
significantly impacted.
One alternative approach to ensuring that functional equivalent
determinations do not undermine states’ traditional regulatory authority
emerges in the scholarship discussing County of Maui.309 It involves
applying the CWA’s objective of preserving states’ traditional regulatory
authority as a guardrail after considering the functional equivalent factors.310
The approach proposes that, where a discharge appears to satisfy the
functional equivalent standard, “a court should not impose liability if federal
regulation of the class of such discharges would upset the Act’s federal-state
balance.”311 It is suggested that imposing liability in such a situation would
be acceptable only if a failure to do so “would incentivize law evasion

305. County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1476 (2020).
306. Id. at 1477.
307. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated,
140 S. Ct. 1462.
308. County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1471–72.
309. See generally Schiff & Roper, supra note 281.
310. Id. at 48–50.
311. Id. at 50.
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through the reconfiguring of otherwise regulated direct discharges.”312 But
the County of Maui Court did not go quite so far when it called for courts to
avoid creating loopholes in the statute.313 A loophole in the CWA’s basic
purpose of protecting surface waters through federal regulation could exist
even where existing dischargers are not likely to change their behavior to
take advantage of such a loophole. Moreover, a theoretical inquiry into the
likelihood that dischargers would reconfigure their point sources to avoid
federal regulation may not always be practical or easy for courts. It also may
not be clear to courts if a “yes” determination under the functional equivalent
standard would undermine the CWA’s cooperative federalism framework.
A significant nexus overlay approach is preferable because it does the
work of balancing the Act’s statutory objectives. It would ensure that the
CWA’s cooperative federalism framework is preserved by finding CWA
jurisdiction only where a point source discharge significantly affects the
integrity of jurisdictional surface waters.314 It would also avoid the problem
of courts needing to determine whether imposing liability would “upset the
federal-state balance,”315 a task that would likely only exacerbate any
inconsistencies among courts applying the County of Maui standard.
Another approach courts might consider to avoid intruding on state
regulatory authority is to ask whether the groundwater discharge at issue is
already regulated by a state statute. If it is not subject to state regulation and
at least some of the factors tend to satisfy the functional equivalent standard,
a court could conclude that federal regulation is warranted. However, such
an approach would not balance the CWA’s objectives as Congress or the
Court intended.316 Congress’s goal was to preserve the traditional authority
of state governments to decide whether and how to regulate groundwater and
non–point source pollution,317 not for the federal government to step in
where states failed to regulate groundwater pollution in a certain way.
Further, focusing on the existence of state groundwater regulations is
impractical, as state policy may change over time. Applying a significant
nexus analysis to groundwater discharges in instances where the functional
equivalent test offers limited guidance is preferable, because it is practical
and ensures that neither of the CWA’s objectives is seriously disturbed.

312. Id. at 50, 48 (“[T]he statutory purpose [of ensuring ample federal regulation] is
violated only if the discharger, in light of the rule articulated, would choose to do the same
thing a different way rather than either keep doing the same thing or cease discharging
altogether.”).
313. See County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1477 (“The underlying statutory objectives also
provide guidance. Decisions should not create serious risks either of undermining state
regulation of groundwater or of creating loopholes that undermine the statute’s basic federal
regulatory objectives.”).
314. Significant effects on the downstream water body can be practically determined
through evaluating scientific data. See Brief for Aquatic Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 3, County of Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260).
315. Schiff & Roper, supra note 281, at 50.
316. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
317. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
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4. Limitations of a Significant Nexus Overlay Approach
The significant nexus overlay approach has limitations, too. Just like the
functional equivalent test, Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus standard
carries some ambiguity and operates on a case-by-case basis,318 which may
present new line-drawing difficulties for courts. It is also only espoused in
one concurrence.319
Although the significant nexus overlay approach does not supply a brightline rule in difficult cases, it does offer a focused question that does the work
of balancing the Act’s objectives.320 The fact that Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence was not joined by other Justices does not reduce its utility in the
groundwater discharge context, especially given the similarities between
Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Breyer’s reasoning.321 Further, lower courts
are already familiar with Justice Kennedy’s test since it has been treated by
many as the controlling opinion in Rapanos.322 While Justice Breyer did not
mention Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test, one possible explanation is
that he did not want to give the impression that the Court was resolving
Rapanos by endorsing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
Despite some potential pitfalls, a significant nexus overlay approach still
offers practical utility to courts, the regulated community, and groups relying
on the CWA’s citizen suit provision. County of Maui contains minimal
guidance for courts navigating difficult applications of the functional
equivalent test, and the overlay approach provides a workable solution for
situations where Justice Breyer’s seven factors do not clearly point in one
direction. If courts employ the approach, the CWA will be more promising
for citizen groups seeking stronger groundwater protections. Additionally,
potentially regulated entities will be better able to predict their own liability
risks.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of County of Maui, the fact-specific and somewhat amorphous
functional equivalent standard may lead to inconsistent applications among
lower courts. Further, the Court’s failure to articulate how the decision
relates, if at all, to the ongoing debate over the scope of “waters of the United
States” adds to the uncertainty generated by the decision. Employing a
significant nexus overlay on the functional equivalent test in difficult cases
can help illuminate a path forward for lower courts. This proposed
framework is both practical to apply and consistent with Congress’s vision
for aggressive federal regulation of water pollution within a cooperative
federal-state partnership.

318.
319.
320.
321.
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See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
See supra notes 282–84 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.

